

~~TOP SECRET~~

Security Information

Official Diary
(Acting DD/I)

Wednesday, 3 December 1952

1. At the morning meeting, presided over by D/DCI, brought up alarming cable from Military in New Delhi regarding possible coup in Nepal within the next two weeks.

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2. Received from D/DCI State policy paper for [REDACTED] regarding the North Atlantic Treaty meetings. Read same and passed it to Sherman Kent with instructions to return to me after appropriate members of the Board had seen it.

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3. Conferred with [REDACTED] on the following matters:

25X1X7

[REDACTED]

25X1A6a

b. Question of appropriate [REDACTED] Ap-
25X1A9a parently, [REDACTED] recommendations once agreed to by [REDACTED] had 25X1A9a
been administratively gutted by one [REDACTED] in FI. Authorized 25X1A9a
25X1A9a direct liaison by [REDACTED] in an attempt to straighten this out.

c. Question of getting access to Camp Dietrich was again reviewed and brief discussion held with General Porter over the phone. He undertook to be helpful in the matter.

d. Flying saucers: Received capsule briefing on recent indications which have caused us to take a far more serious view of unexplained observations. Reviewed the course the Director should take and the

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

25X1A9a5. Met with Messrs. Kent, [REDACTED] on 25X1A9a
the question of drafting terms of reference for the new summary evaluation. Informed them that a preliminary paper must be available by Thursday, December 11, so that DCI could study it before his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 15 December. The chief points I stressed were the necessity of working backwards from critical objectives in the United States, determining these, the number of twenty or fifty Kiloton bombs necessary to damage each "critically" (whenever that may be), then considering the ability to deliver bombs on target in terms of percentage and finally bringing into play the limitations of the Russian stockpile probably using

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
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5. (cont'd.)

three or four alternative hypotheses as to the size thereof. As a final cut an estimate of the amount needed to neutralize our overseas retaliatory power should be considered. Left the meeting before it was fairly underway, but believe there was general agreement on the scope of the study.

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Accomplished by [redacted] DCI Then

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6. (cont'd.)

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7. Attended PRC Meeting.

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